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ABSTRACT. 
This thesis looks at how accurately project managers call pre-
pretlict what problems may ari~·e during 1111 Information 
Systems project they are about to commence based on their 
e.'Cperience ofpreviom projects. The second part i11vestigates 
what actions a project ma11ager is likely to take to expedite a 
troubled project. Both of these questions are investigated and 
it is found that while project ma11agers cmz confidently predict 
which problems could arise, and how to take actio11s to rectifY 
such actions when they occur, these problems still arise. 
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FtlcltH'.'i Affectillg tire Stu·t.·ess oflnjfmlttltion .. \:y.\·tems t•rt~jecl.'i 
I INTRODUCTION 
Most information Systems I lnfOnnation Technology projects nm over budget. by 
as much IS01X1 (Johnson, 1995) over the initial estimates. Rl:asons listed !ill· these 
failures arc; the nature of the people in the industry (Brooks Jr. 11J75; YounJon. 
1997); the inherent guesses used for estimations; the complexity or the projects 
often being t•ndercstimated, and finally, the requirements of the system being 
unclear or inCO!Teetly speei tied. 
The cost of these failed or ill-managed projects is astronomical. It is said billions 
of dollars a year are presently being wasted in these type of projects (King. 1997). 
Infom1ation Technology projects can seem to be 'money su<":king black holes· to 
many organisations. Ultimately the prevention of these types of projects lies 
outside the scope of this study; this study will however atlcmpt to map thL' 
thoughts of various project managers to sec ho\\' they work. Do they learn fl·orn 
their past mistakes and failures, can they foresee potential problems bcllxe they 
occur, and most importantly, when the problems occur, what actions do they take 
to correct them? 
This study assumes that the tools used for Information Systems arc computers. it 
will examine the management of projects that develop Information Technology 
solutions. 
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1.1. MAJOR QuHsnoNs ro llH ,.WmlFSSUJ. 
The study is broken down into to parts; Part A. (th~.: planning section), and Part 
B. (the c:xpL.xliting section). The questions this study addresses arc as !<lllows. 
Why do problems re-occur with Information Systems/ InfOrmation 
Technology projects? This question was addressed for both project planning 
and expediting. 
1.1.1. PARTA. PLANS!SG. 
What factors can project managers readily identify as being the most 
important when they arc evaluating or planning Information Systems 
project with large solhvarc composition? 
How do the ractors identified by the project managers compare \\·ith the 
factors identified by the existing academic literature on this topic'? 
Page 1-9 
F(u'ltlr.o; Afll.•ctiiiJ.: the Sm'£'t.'.\".\"tJf/11ftJrmutitm .\)·.,·tems Project.\· 
1.1.1. P.·IRTB. EXPEJJ/7"/N(i. 
What corrective actions do project managers readily adopt into tiH.:ir 
projects when the need to expedite a late or troubled project is n.:quin.:d'.' 
How do the corrective actions identified by the project managers 
compare with the factors identified by the existing academic literature for 
this topic. 
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2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 f~~Il.URE 
What is fililurc'! 
The Collins English Dictionary defines it as follows: 
""jhilure 11. 
• The act or an instance of failing. 
e A person or thing that is unsuccessful or disappointing: the evening 
was a failure. 
• Non-perfonnancc of something required or cxpcct~d: failure to attend 
will be punished. 
• Cessation ofnonnal operations: breakdown. 
• An insufficiency or shortage: a crop failure. 
• A decline or loss, as in health or strength. 
• The fact of not reaching the required standard in an examination. test. 
course, etc. 
• The act or process of becoming bankrupt or the state of being 
bankrupt." 
-Source (Hanks & Wilkes, 1986, Pages 545- 546) 
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2.2 WIIAT IS 1·:·1/LURE? 
The word 'Failun;' is usually associatcd with had things as shown above in the 
definition provided. What it l:tils to mention is how hcndicial failure is to us. 
Jung ( 1933) stated that psychotherapists learn little if ;mything from their 
successes, but their ntilurcs arc priceless, as they may forcl: them to change 
their methods and views. However, J\ckofT( 1994) points out that a mistake [a 
tltilurc] is an indicator of a gap in one's knowledge. Fortune & Pch.:rs ( 1995) 
write an entire book on learning from your failures, they mention that failure 
goes beyond the simple definition of something not meeting expectations, or 
going wrong. Several types or categories of failures have been idcnti lied. 
• Type 1. Objectives not met. 
This type of failure occurs when the aims I objectives of the user, designer 
or sponsor of some things expectations arc not fully met. 1.c. A toll bridge 
which carries barely any traffic. 
• Type 2. Undesirable side effects. 
This type of failure occurs when the aims I objects of the user, designer or 
sponsor of some things expectations arc met, but some undesirable side 
effects have presented themselves. Typical examples of this can be 
medical drugs. 
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• Type 3. l>t•sigll'~d F~tilurcs. 
This typl: of railurc occurs when certain conditions are nH.:t and aims 
typically to protect the us<.:r, designer or sponsor. An dcctrical fusc is a 
good example or a type J fllilurc, when too much power attempts to cntt:r 
the device the fuse · f~1i Is' thus protecting the device. 
• Type 4. Inappropriate objectives 
This type of failure occurs when the objectives that were set arc met, with 
no ~Jverse effects, but there is no longer any demand, need or market for 
it. 
Lyytinen & Robey (1999) write about learning to fail in Information 
Systems development, in which they argue that organisations fail to learn 
from their experiences in systems development due to the limits or 
organisational intelligence, disincentives lOr learning and organisational 
barriers. 
Page2-13 
F(Jc/!lrs Aj}i'L'Iiug tlw .\'m:c·c•s.,· ofllljimmlliou.\)•stem.'> PN~jects 
2.3 PROJECT SUCCESS AND 1-:·1/W//E. 
It is difficult to de lin~ what constitutes project l~lilure. LKh proll:ssional's 
detinition of it differs. Younlon ( 1997) writes that soft\van: prujccts are often 
50 tu I 00 percent over budget. and on average likely to he() 12 months behind 
schedule. In an article by Johnson (19'>5) he reports that out ofSOO projects 
surveyed, none were within schedule or budget, and 4(Y1f! were likdy to he 
cancelled. Consultants KPMG defined the difference between a failure and a 
success atJO% OVCITLII1 of estimated (Cole, 1995), where as (jJass ( 1998) would 
not regard a project as a failure unless it had ovenun estimates by I ()(Jl%. 
A project may also be a 'failure' if it docs not meet the users requirements 
(Weinberg, 1991) regardless ofifit was completed within budget or not. This 
altcmate view is that the above over-runs may not be classed as failures if the 
program meets or exceeds the users needs. Boehm (2()00) writes about the fact 
that a tenninated project docs not automatically mean a failed project; projects 
can be tenninatcd for a variety of reasons, C\'Cil if they \\'ere not classed as a 
failed project. 
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There is no absolute way to deli.:rmine ira project is success or !itilun..: (Belassi 
& Tu kd, ! 99(J ). The vttnous stakeholders, users, project team and m<.magcmcnt 
might all view the same project from various differing perspectives, and thus 
can arrive at a Ji ffcrcnt conclusion about the success uf a project. For example, 
an article in 'Computing Canada' (Denies, I 9!S8) reports on a study by a global 
communications consultancy that remOves the blame for failed Information 
Technology from the Information Technology departments and places the blame 
directly with the top decision makers who fail to adopt the recognised best 
practices. 
A study by the Standish Group collected infonnation from 365 surveys that 
represented over 8,380 Information Technology projects conducted within the 
previous year (Johnson, 1995). The study showed that in excess of 31 1Yr, of 
projects started would be cancelled before eompJ,-.:tion, and of those remaining. 
53% of them will run over their initial estimates by 189%. The study also 
breaks the types of"rcsolutions" achieved into three categories: 
r Resolution Type 1 -A successful project, within time and budget 
,.. Resolution Type 2- A challenged project, project is completed, but either 
•!• Over budget 
•!• Reduced functionality 
•!• Fewer Features 
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> Resolution Type 3 -An Impaired project, The project was cancelled. 
Johnson: Project Success by Type 
FIGURE 2-1. JOHNSON'S SUCCESS BY COMPANY TYPE. 
-Source (Johnson, 1995, Page 5) 
Figure 2-1 was reproduced from (Johnson, 1995) and graphically illustrates 
the findings of the Standish Group report. He (Johnson, 1995) further breaks 
the success I fail rate down into small, medium and large businesses, they 
company size was dependant on annual revenue Figure 2-2. 
Success by Business size 
Type3 
Type2 
Type1 
m 
Success Pe<centoge 
FIGURE 2-2. TYPE RESULTS BY BUSINESS SIZE. 
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Source (Johnson, I CJ(JS, Page 5) 
As can be seen abon:: in Figure 2-1, the largl!r the company, thl.! mun: likcly they 
arc to have their projects become more dinicult to manage and increase the chance 
of project I~Iilurc. From this data it shows that small companies have a gn:at<.;r 
chance of succeeding in projects than do llll!dium and large organisations. 
2.4 THE ROOTS OF PROJECT FAILURE 
Ed Yourdon ( 1997) introduced the notion of a 'death march' project: 
"!define a demh march project as one whose 'project parameters' exceed 
the norm by at least 50 percent". 
- (Yourdon, 1997, p2) 
Yourdon likens such software projects to the 'death marches' of history. He 
implies that casualties will happen because of the urgency of the project. short 
time frame, and a perception by management that it will be finished on time. A 
combination of any of the below can constitute the creation of a 'death march' 
project: 
• The schedule has been reduced to less than 50(X) of original plan. 
• The staff has been reduced to 50(Yo or less of the original plan. 
• The budget has been cut, forcing shortcuts and cost saving. 
• Functionality changes- this is common as the system needs to do more 
than it was designed to do. 
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In his classic analysis of Information '1\:chnology projects, I !rooks (I <J75) 
states that most projects fail for 'lack of calendar time' than for all otlu.:r 
reasons combined. The causes he cites arc: 
$ Techniques of estimation arc poorly developed. 
o They arc often optimistic 'all will go we! I'. 
• Confusion over effort and progress-- The assumption that men and months 
are interchangeable. 
• Managers arc uncertain about their estimates. 
• Progress along the schedule is poorly monitored. 
• When the schedule falls behind, more manpower is added. like feeding 
oxygen to a fire. 
2.5 ESTIMATIONS AND PROBLEMS THAT COME WI Til 1HEM. 
The main problem within the software industry, some 40 odd years alter its 
conception, is not building or writing the software. Echoing Brooks, Glass 
(Glass, 1998) argues that the main problems arise with the estimation of how 
long it will take to do the project. 
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Although the main purpose or Information 'l'l.:chnology in most organisations 
is the storage of historical data, the soil ware intlustry has bel:n very poor at 
documenting its own history. Tht.: industry, generally, has not madl: a 
conscientious effort to keep records of past project costs and duration (Glass, 
1998). Another major distinction between industries is that whereas you can 
visually sec and assess progress in an engineering project to build. The 
progress or a construction of a bridge is much easier to gauge than that of a 
software product, due to the tangible nature of the bridge, the progress of the 
project can be observed easier due to the physical presence of a bridge, 
software has no such tangible presence. 
Yourdon ( 1997) writes in these days there arc many aides a\ .tilable to the 
project manager to better assist their estimations such as: 
• Commercial Estimating Tools- Computer packages that assist the 
manager to make better estimates, the problem with this. as with most 
computer programs is that the quality of the end result depends on the 
quality of the inputs. In other words garbage in, garbage out (Lam, 1998). 
• Systems dynamics models- Mathematical models that have been 
developed to explore the relationship belwcen entities involved in the 
project, for example the various COCOMO models (Boehm, 198\) and 
COCOMO 2 (Boehm eta\., 1996). 
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• The SoH wan.: Engineering Institute has dont.: extensive n.:sean:h into this 
area, ami has c\·cn published checklists and guidelines on it (Park, I 1JIJh). 
Despite the 1~1ct that ample n;sourcl:s arc available to aid in estimations, otlwr 
problems arise. Thomsctt ( 1996) wrote about what he termed "negotiation 
games". That is, games that managers and project managers often engage in. 
He mentions a number of these games that arc described below: 
• Doubling ami atld some 
Th\s technique involves the project manager making an initial estimate and 
then doubling it and adding say an additional 1 01YrJ to that Juration. 
• Reverse doubling 
Management uses this technique typically, when the project manager 
brings his estimates to his superior, the first thing the manager docs is halr 
the estimate as he recalls his project management <.lays when he used the 
Doubling and add some method. 
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• "Gue.\'.\' the mtmht!l' I'm tlliukiug oF' 
This is when the senior person already has a11 "acceptable'' Jigure in 111ind 
i.e. the figure he told his boss. They ask their subordinate for an cstimatr.;, 
and then tell them its unacceptable and to give a more n:alistic estimatr.;. 
This continues until the figure matches the duration he initially quoted, as 
the subordinate gave the estimate. he is hc\d to it. 
• Double dummy spit 
This is when a project manager brings in his initial estimates to 
management and the manager goes into a hysterical fit about the length of 
the project, the first dummy spit. The project manuger scurries away and 
reviews his estimates and returns with the rc\·ised estimations. The 
manager will have another hysterical lit at this time. The managers' 
reason for this is to create fear in the project manager so that they \\·ill 
agree with whatever they are told to prevent the fits. 
• Spanish inquisition 
This technique is when a project manager walks into a meeting with senior 
management and is asked on the spot for an estimation, often without 
knowledge of what he is estimating about. All of the managers wait fOr 
the reply from the project manager. 
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• Goldut 
Project Managers typically do this lcchniquc I(H· revenge:, they at:ct.:pl 
totally unn.:alistic estimates. Tht: theory being the company will hL: l(m.:ed 
to lltct.: the rc.:ality of soli ware project management, olh:n after lots of 
money has been spent already. 
• Clliuese water torture 
Instead of delivering the bad news of a blown project all at once, the 
manager delivers the nC\VS in small snippets, "Component X was only 4 
days late" this docs not sound too bad until you look at the entire project. 
It is like the dripping water in the Chinese water torture, drip. drip. and 
drip. No single drip (piece of bad news) will kill you, but the cumulative 
effect can be fatal. 
2.6 PEOPLE IN THE PROJECT 
(Programmer behavior in software projects) 
If a post-mortem examination was done on most unsuccessful software 
projects it would find that most of them failed due to people related matters 
(Fcibus, 1998). 
Page 2-22 
I 
r 
The produeti\'ity of a programmer can also havl' a gn.:at nnpact o11 any prtllect. 
Bryan (I '>94) tdls of a study that analysed the prmluctt\'IIY oJ' a w1dc range <d 
programmt:rs. Bryan found that tht: top27% ofprugrannncrs d1d 7X'Y,, oft he 
work. These lind i ngs arc close tu tht: normal i \T pred ic! tons or the Pan:t1 1 
theory, that 801/IJ of the total output is produCI.:d by only 20'X~ ofth<: n:lcvant 
population. 
ln a study by Sackman, Erikson, and Grant as referred to by (Brooks, 1975) 
the perfonnancc within a group of experienced programmers were mcasun:d. 
Within this small group, the productivity of individual programmers varied so 
widely that the ratio for productivity averaged I 0:1 and on program speed and 
space taken up the ratio averaged 5:1. 
ln another study (Stackman, 1968) it is reported ofproductiYity ratios of up to 
25:1 for p:-ogramming tasks, and up to 28: I for debugging programs. All 
programmers involved in the study were familiar with that application 
development area. He further goes on to say that he would c:..:pcct to find 
productivity ratios of 5:1 on most software projects. 
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The before mentioned study (Bryan, 1994) conducted on nearly 200 
programmers over a period of 12 years brought forth similar results as 
Stackman (1968). The number of programmers working on the CP-6 project 
ranged from a low of 15, to a peek of 150. The data of how much work each 
programmer did was recorded on a database as part of the management of the 
project. The project was a 4.2 million-line program that was being developed; 
a productivity variation of 200 to 1 separated the top programmer from the 
worst one. 
Software Errors Fixed 
N!.!mber Frxad per- progr-ammer 
1+oo,-------------------------------------------, 
1200+----------·----------------------------~ 
1000+-------------------------------·--------~ 
~ 600*-------~---------------- ~--------------4 
G: j 600~----------------------------------------~ 400··~~~----------------------------------------1 
"·----200+-~~~ --~-.----------------------------~-
' ••-••···"'"''''"'''''"'"''"''nn""'...,.""'....,.,...,..mTfl""'<""""""'''' iiiillliiilililiililii) 
FIGURE 2-3. SOFTWARE BUGS FIXED BY PROGRAMMER. 
-Source (Bryan, 1994,Page 350) 
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Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 display respectively the number of bugs (STARs) 
fixed by the top 156 programmers, 36 programmers were not recorded as they 
had below 5 fixes. There is very little noticeable difference in the two figures, 
the general shape remains constant. Software "bugs" make up over half of the 
STARs reported (Bryan, 1994). Thayer (1997) states that STAR's is an 
acronym for Software Technology for Adaptive, Reliable Systems. It cannot 
be said if the meaning here is a different meaning than used in Bryan (1994). 
Totd STARs Responded 
Rasponsa·s par progr"ommerr 
3000,--------------------------------------, 
2500+-------------------------------------~ 
~2000*-------------------------------------~ 
l ~1500~------------------------------------~ 
"" ~tOOQ~------------------------------------~ 
500+--~~r-~~----------------------------~ 
0 ""'"""'""'""g. '*'' lhl. jil\&11¥1"'"'' 414Wiih 
FIGURE 2-4. TOTAL STARs ANSWERED BY EACH PROGRAMMER. 
-Source (Bryan, 1994,Page 350) 
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Fixes per Man Year 
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" I '--'>, ! \00 I i ~ ' ' 
~ 5: i 
--------------
FIGURE 2-5. SOFTWARE BUG FiXING RATF. Ill' TOP 51 PIWGRAMER.\', 
-Source (Bryan, 1994,Pagc 352) 
Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 are adjusted figures, dependent on years employed, 
and proportion of development responsibilities, as opposed to management of 
people, teams etc. The gross time used over 12 years equalled 320 work-
years, but was tracked at 217 work-years; it is doubtful if this number takes 
into account overtime. Figure 2-6. shO\VS the productiYity in bug fixing per 
Man I Work year. They as a group fixed 11.151 bugs. \\'hich is 78°·n of 
reported bugs. The top programmer fixed 8% of the hugs himself. a 
remarkable feat, these were not just easy problems as one might expect. 
Rather he fixed some quite difficult problems ranging all over the project. 
most of the bugs he fixed he had not coded, nor had any knowledge of that 
component prior to debugging the code. 
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Software Bugs Fixed per Man Year 
FIGURE 2-6. FIX PRODUCTIVJT'f BY TOP 20 PROGRAMMERS. 
-Source (Bryan, 1994,Page 352) 
Figure 2-7 graphically illustrates how a programmer's, time is taken up. As 
can be seen a relatively small part of it (13 %) is actually spent programming. 
Most of their time is taken up with communications, reading and other 
learning activities. 
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What do programmers do? 
Mat! & Wise ell 
documents 
1'1 dllllllg 
6% 
Sf!lft 
5% Wntmg r,rr;_gram ~ 
Readmg programs 
&manuals 
16% 
Personal 
13% 
[From "Software Engmeering Economics". Bany Boehm] 
13% 
Job u,mmumcatJr,n 
32"/o I 
__ j 
FIGURE 2w7. JVIIAT TAKES UP A PROGRAMMER'S 71.1//;' 
-Source (Boehm, 1981, page 341 ; Salt, 1999) 
Brooks (1975) says that computer programs arc optimists. He points to the 
relatively young age of coders, and argues "the young are uh\'(/ys optimists". 
That combined with the programmers attitude and optimistic comments like "I 
just found the last bug" is sufficient to satisfy Brook's that they \\'Cl"C 
optimists, and that, being optimists, it is likely that their estimates will also be 
optimistic. Yourdon (1997) mentions similar views as Brooks. 
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In the recruitment of programmers or technical staff, Zawacki (I 9S5) reports 
on his experiences as a human resources person recruiting ln!(mmttion 
Technology people. He reports that mangers have great conliUence in their 
opinions if the programmer which arc fOrmed 011 a short interview. The 
interviewer typically has a stereotype in minU for the joh and attempts to 
match a candidate with that image. 
While the previous section could be regardeU as the emphasis for project 
failures being the responsibility of the computer programmer, that is not 
necessarily true. While it is true that some software components can be 
difficult to design and write and thus difficult to predict the required time for 
that component. There is no doubt that often the software can be the delaying 
factor, it is not always so, the final product can only be as good as the 
submitted design. 
2. 7 WHY DO PROGRAMMERS DO THESE DEATH MARCH PROJECTS? 
There arc a variety of reasons why project managers and programmers get 
involved in these 'Death March' projects. Yom·don ( 1997) idcnti lies the top 
reasons he has found: 
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• lligh risk, hut also hiuh l't.'JI'tmf.,·. 
These projects may have a large risk associated with them from day one, 
but so arc tile rewards if they succeed. A good example of these \VDuld he 
Internet start-up companies, they pay their employees in stock options. and 
if the project is successful the shares arc valuable. This worked wcll for 
Microsoft after all, which has one of the highest ratios of millionaires per 
workforce in the world (Cusumano & Selby, 1996). 
• Mt E••erest syndrome. 
This category is for those people who desire challenges and go out of their 
way to attempt challenges. A project in failure could attract a type of 
person who really believes they can win the challenge. 
• Youth nai'vete and optimism. 
This category is for those people who arc still in their early to mid 
twenties, single, free of commitments. They sti II have their naivety and 
optimism, "can't everyone work 70-hour weeks and write perfect code at 
the same time". 
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• Tlti.,· m· Ullemploymeut. 
It was a choice of this project or to look for a new job, while this nwy not 
bother the young programmers who arc free of chi ldrcn, mortgag<.:s etc that 
believe they can walk into a new job tomorrow. For the okler 
programmers \vho have these burdens and perhaps outdated programming 
experience this can be a signilicant reason for going to the troubled 
project. 
• For future adl•mtcemelll. 
In some way your participation or the ultimate success of the project may 
influence your future career path, i.e. promotions, career pathway etc. 
• Escape from bureaucracy. 
Some organisations are notorious for their paperwork and strict rules that 
govem how a person docs specific tasks, in troubled projects tht.:sc 
formalities are often overlooked so as the people can work more 
efficiently. Some people may sign on to a projcct!Or such a reason. 
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• Rel'euge. 
This category may seem a little strange as a motivating reason to do a 
troubled project; it is not unknown for battles to he !Ought amongst senior 
management. An easy way to make one of your "opponents" look had is 
to sabotage their projects, i.e. insert incompetent starr into their project. 
2.8 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PEOPLE AND TEAMS 
A problem common to all projects is time; Brooks (1975) addresses this issue. 
He developed what is known as 'Brooks' Law', which has been deliberately 
over simplified as: 
"Adding manpower to a late softll'are project makes it lute .. 
- (Brooks, 1975,pp 25) 
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It must be said, however, Brooks' Law, (Brooks Jr, 1975) is tru~:.: only of the 
tasks that involve t·ommunication between thc various programnH.:rs. Any task 
that is indcp~.:ndcnt {no dependent communications) would not fall into this 
category. Time is also needed to train the new people in work practices, and 
new sta!Twill ollcnmodify work previously cumpll.:tcll hy other people. If 
this wen:: to happen, a system to keep track of software changes etc like the 
one as described in Microso!l Secrets (Cusumano & Selby, 1996; Cusumano 
& Selby, 1997) would be required. 
Some tasks can be completed faster by adding manpower; those arc the tasks 
that require no co~ordination of activities between team members or 
components. Others duration can be increased, assuming they have a 
dependency upon each other. The final category of tasks arc ones that will 
take x time regardless of how many people arc assigned. an example \\·auld be 
cooking bread, It will take 3 hours regardless of how many ovens arc used 
(Brooks, 1975). 
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A recent estimate reported that in the United States, hdween 70 to H(J pt:rccnl 
of all businesses were using team concepts (Chaney & Lydt.:n, 2000). 
Communication between members of any team is essential, Amhayc ( 1 (j(JS) 
identifies the m<~or cause of l~tilurc of Information Technology teams is the 
lack of communication between team members. As shown previously in 
Figure 2-7 a large proportion of their time is taken up in communication 
activities. 
While in the past, teams for software production may have bcCil in the same 
lo~ation; presently with the use of Internet technologies this is no longer 
necessarily true. The Virtual Organisation, or the Virtual Team arc taking 
shape and doing a large percentage of the software development. India is very 
prominent in this field; its lnfom1ation Technology industry has grown from 
53.9 billion in 1988- 1989 to 5200 billion in 1998 - 1999 due it outsourcing 
many American companies software development (Chand. 2000). 
Communication between virtual team members is vital as it is the onlv wav the . . 
can succeed (Chase, 1999), this is doubly so with rapidly developed sotlware 
(Bullinger, Warschat, & Fischer, 2000). 
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2.8./ COMMUN/Cfl'UJN MonHJ.S. 
Mantei ( 1981) reports that there arc two nwin rl!cognis<.:d group structures 
for managing programming projects, these arc Bakers chief programmers 
team (Baker, 1972) and Weinberg's ego-less team (Weinberg, 1971 ). A 
third. a hybrid of the two was also found (Curtin University, I CJ91J) and 
included. 
Democratic team 
FIGURE 2-8. TilE DEMOCRA11C TEAM. 
- Source (Bcnnatan, 1995, page 74) 
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The above Pi~ure 2-8 uses a di ITcrent name than Wienberg (I CJ71 ) does, in 
this model each person in the team has the satnL: say and input as eaeh 
other. Whil~.: there is a team leader, they foster open communications 
bctwel.!n all tcammcmh~.:rs, the usc of~.:-mail and group rm:etings is 
paramount in this mmil.:l. One of" the main problems with model is that 
team members often consume vast amount of' time arguing ovt:r trivial 
malters (Mall, 1998 ). and personality con nicts. 
maximum 1111111her or clwnne/s = ~~-11(11-~J 
- - "- 2 
EQUATION], NIAXIMUMCOMMUNJCATIONCIIANNEJ.S. 
The above fonnula can be used to compute the maximum number of 
possible channels which could be needed for a team of any given size to 
communicate effectively. the assumption is that only one channel {medium) 
is used to communicate to each individual team member. The abo\'C 
example (Figure 2-8) uses a maximtllll of I 0 channels. if they same !igurc 
had 15 Nodes, up to 105 channels could be needed. Clearly the more 
people I nodes the greater the time spent in reading I writing e-mail. 
meetings and the like, small teams arc more productive for this and other 
reasons. It is stated that teams consisting of less than I 0 people are much 
more efficient for programming projects (Brooks, 1975; Younlon. 1997) 
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emeber 
(;,,;; I 
~'!m<':berJ 
·___./ 
(Team 'j 
~~lemebo:V 
-~___/ 
Chief Engineering team 
FIGURJ; 2-9, CHIEF ENGINEER/;\'G TEAM 
-Source (Bcnnatan, 1995. Page 74) 
The Chief Engineering Team model is named the same by both 8akcr 
(1972) and Bcnnatan ( 1995). The above diagram (F(qure J-9) illustrates 
the Chief Engineering Team model, there is far less communication 111 this 
model than in the Ego-less I Democratic team, in this instance the team 
leader assigns each team member what tasks they should perform. There is 
little feedback to the team leader, and as shown, little if any fom1al 
communication between team members, although no fonnaltcam 
communications occur, shoptalk may be done informally between team 
members at breaks, or out of work hours. In reality. the team members 
would communicate with each other as they need to. 
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FIGURE 2-10. Hl'BRID MODEL OF TEAM CO.UMUNIC1TJONS. 
The third model is a hybrid of both the previous two models, this approach 
is similar to that used in Microsoft (Cusumano & Sclbv. 1996}. This model 
is effective when used on large projects, as systems arc broken do\\"11 to 
their components and ultimately small teams get assigned these components 
to build, they arc free to use whatever team structure they please. as long as 
they achieve results. 
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Communication b~.:twccn theses divisions or lt:ams may abo he nccc.:ssary; 
Fig11re 2-11 below is an illustration of how teams could work in Microsoft. 
The structure at the top ofthl! ligurc is correct, as reported by (('usiJJlla!lo & 
Selby, \996), artistic license was used on the low<.:r levels. In it, the 
development group project managers communicatL: with each other so as to 
check how their latest improvements will affect each other, i.e. will the new 
update ofOrficc 2000 have adverse effects with any of the Operating 
Systems. While not shown, some communication may also take place 
within groups, for instance all the project team leaders of the Office suite 
(\Vord, Excel, PowerPoint etc) may communicate regularly as integration 
of these products is essential. 
·-. 
( Bill ) 
\Gates. 
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FIGURE 2-11. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW TEAMS COULIJ WORK IN MICROSOFT. 
2.9 FACTORS UNDERLYING PROJECT FAILURE 
Fcu•tm·s Ajfectillg the Sm·c_·ess tJflufomwtioll Systems Pu~jecls 
Robert Glass (1998) describes some lltctors that contribute to projects running 
over budget I schedule: 
• The size of the project the greater the size of the project the mon.: 
likely that it will have ddays. 
• Project failures normally result from not one single cause Normally it's 
a combination of several causes. 
• Sales talk- what the salesman sold you is not what the system can do, 
the salesman promises anything for the sale. 
• Technology- The technology was either new, non-existent or not 
understood by the project teams. 
a Perfonnance- Real-time systems arc often too slow to do live 
transactions once built. 
TABLE 1 JONES SUCCESSFUL V5 UVSUCCESSFUL F·lCTOR~' 
' 
" 
. . .
Unsuccr.ssful pro.iect tecbnolo~ies Successful project technologies 
No Historical software measurement data Accurate software measurement 
Failure to use automated estimating tools Early usage of estimating tools 
Failure to use automated planning tools Continuous usage o£.planning ~?ols 
Failure to monitor progress of milestones Formal progress !eporti~!g·--· 
Failure to use dcsig_n reviews Formal design rc\'iC\\'S 
Failure to use code insepections Formal code inspccti~~l.s 
Generalists used for critical tasks: Specialists used for critical tasks: 
Quality assurance Quality assurance 
Testing Testing 
Planning Planning 
Estimating Estimating 
' I 
' 
' 1 
I 
I 
____j 
I 
Inadequate design and specifications Automated design and sr_ccifications ~ 
Failure to use formal configuration Automated configuration control I 
control 
More than 30% creep in user Less then 1 Q!X) creep in user 
requirements rcqu i rements 
-Source (Jones, 1995, Page 3) 
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Table 1 idcntilics the top I 0 technology factors that can be associated with 
successful ami unsuccessful software projects (.Iones, I 91)5 ). This was takt:n 
from (JO risk factors that were identified by Casper (IIJ<J4) and can allCct the 
affect the overall outcome of a software project. 
2.10 FLOWERS CRITICAL FACTORS. 
St~phen Flo\vers has developed what be calls his Critical Failure Factors 
(Flowers, 1996). It consists of 17 factors, broken down into three phases of 
the project; organisational context, the management of the project and the 
conduct of the project i.e. actually doing the implementation which he has 
identified as causing project failures with the lnfom1ation Systems area. In a 
later paper, Flowers (Flowers, 1997) only identi fics 15 factors. mostly 
differently labeled and identifies for six infamous cases \\·hat the factots 
involved were, details on this infommtion can be found in Appendix 5. 
These Critical Failure Factors (Table 2) arc used as one of the building blocks 
for the Part A. of this research; below the table are listed definitions of each 
factor. 
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Organizational context 
Hostile Culture 
Poor reporting structures 
Management of project 
Over-Commitment 
Political pressures 
Conduct of the Project 
Initiation Phase 
Technology Focused 
Lure of leading edge 
Complexity underestimated 
Analysis & Design phase 
Poor consultation 
Design by committee 
Technical 'fix' for management problem 
Poor procurement 
Development phase 
Staff turnover 
Competency 
Communication 
Implementation phase 
Receding deadlines 
Inadequate testing 
Inadequate user Training 
-Source Flowers (1996,pp 158) 
Fl Hosile Culture. This factor relates to the overall culture of the 
organisation I organisations being worked with. Do they shoot the messenger 
who delivers the bad news, do they look for 'scapegoats', arc they reluctant to 
change their methods and generally made like difficult for outside consultants. 
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F2 Poor rcportin~. This lltctor relah:s to the overall rcporting for the 
pmjcct, or the entities within the projcd; do status reports and requL:sts f(>r 
meetings ami infi.mwttion get passed to the upper managemcnt L!chclons. 
F3 0\'cr commitment. This factor relates typically to thc man<~gcment or 
sponsorship of the projects. Managers may be too keen on the project 
succeeding and make it their personal vision, they may alter figure and put 
misleading infonnation in reports to justify their projects survival, i.e. the 
oasis is just over the next sand dune. 
F4 Politics. This factor relates to any political matters of influence that 
may creep into the project. It can be either within the Government, you 
development team or in the departments being worked on. 
F5 Technology focused. This factor relates to the project being more 
related to the technical aspects as opposed to the human aspects of the system. 
This could be partly due to the stereotypical image of programmers and other 
techies. 
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F6 Lure of Leading edge. This ll1ctor relates to the technological ll1ctors 
of the project. while Information Tccfmolngy can give a company a lcading 
edge in thc marketplac~:, it is by no m~.:ans always true. Some m:w leading 
technologies will flop and is it wise to attempt the latest technology, or a tried 
and tcsteJ system. 
F7 Complexity. This factor relates to the overall complexity oftiH: 
project. This may happen becal;se of lack of unJerstanding ahout the project, 
or it could be in attempt to simplify the project for estimation reasons. 
F8 Poor consultation. This factor relates to the lack of consultation with 
the major stakeholders of the project Juring the analysis phase. 
F9 Design by committee. This factor relates to all the problems with a 
project, or the project requirements being designed by a committee. The 
problems conccming conflicting personalities. power struggles. gumc playing 
and alliances etc. 
FlO Technical fix for management issue. This factor relates to those 
problems that arc management issues and cannot be solved exclusiYcly with 
technological solutions. 
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Ft 1 Poor procurement. This !l1ctor relates to all procurement !;tclors, this 
could be related to any hardware or soflwarc compmH.:nts that ncL:d to h<: 
purchased o!Tthc shelf. 
Fl 2 Turnover (staff). This factor concerns the turnover of staff from your 
project; while some turnover of any project is natural, cxccssi vc turnover 
could imply that your project in is trouble for a variety of' reasons. 
Fl3 Competency. This factor concerns the competency of your staff in all 
aspects of your project. 
F14 Communication. This factor concerns the channels of 
communications both with t!1e organisation and the project team. Examples of 
use here could be to combat the rumor mills. 
FlS Deadlines. This factor concems the slippage or schedule. missed 
milestones, and other time goals of the project not being met. 
Fl6 Testing. This factor relates to testing the new systems both at the 
conceptual level i.e. the Entity Relation Ships and Data Flow Diagrams, and 
the physical level i.e. the programs and systems themselves. 
F17 Training. This Factor relates to all training matters, \Vithcr it be 
development stafC users, user-support training. 
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1.11 EXI'EIJITING ACTIONS F0/11/l!NAWA Y PI/O.IEC7S. 
Cole ( 1995), on behalf or KPMG conducted a study in 11)94 to study runaway 
projects within the lnfonnation Technology area. This study was actually a 
follow up to an identical study run five years previously. 
The original study in 1989 was conducted upon 250 major organisations 
within the United Kingdom from a variety of different sectors. The interviews 
were conducted by an independent research body via the telephone, and lasted 
up to 45 minutes with senior personnel in lnform<tlion Technology, Finance or 
Operations (Cole, I 995). 
In 1994, the same independent research company was again commissioned to 
re-run the same test on the original participants. Approximately half' of the 
original respondents were willing to be in the survey, 120 companies in all 
(Cole, I 995). 
The summaries of Cole's findings will be listed below. 1 
1 These figures are estimates only. They based on the original results that were 
released in graph format only. 
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Figure 2-12 below shows the remedies that the respondents said that they 
would apply to fix a runaway project in graphical format, 
Cotes rectifying actions 
E>.londing the Schedule 
Beller Projeot M•nagement Procedures 
Mo'" Peopl . 
More Fund . 
Pre.ssU!e on Suppliers by W•lhholding Paymen 
' 
Reduction in Projed Scope 
Now Outside Help 
Botlor O!Mllopmont Methodologies 
Pressme on Suppliers by Th"'at oflilig•lino 
Change of Technology used on the Projec '~ 
Abandoning the Projec '~ 
Othe '~ 
!1% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 00% 90% 1!]1)% 
FIGURE 2-12. THE ACTIONS IDENTIFIED FOR RECTIFYING A RUNAWAY PROJECT 
-Source (Cole, 1995,Page 2) 
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Table 3. below, is the same information in a tabular format. 
SOURCE(Cole, 1995,p2) 
The study (Cole, 1995) also asked of the respondents what if any adverse 
effects the runaway projects had on their company as a whole Figure 2-13 
below shows the responses to this graphically, Table 4. displays the same data 
in tabular format. Wasted resources (time, money, etc., although they all 
equate to money) and reduced moral within the company were the main 
adverse effects discovered in the study. 
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Adverse Effects to Business 
Reduced customer satisfaction .f!i!lf!i!lf!i!lf!i!lf!i!li!i!li!i!l~ 
Contractual disputes with suppliets ~i!i!lf!i!l~'fj 
Lost sales -~~ 
FIGURE 2-13. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS THE RUNAWAY PROJECT HAD ON BUSINESS. 
-Source (Cole, 1995,Page 2) 
-Source (Cole, 1995,Page 2) 
Another part of the research also looked at what actions or procedures they 
respondents would pay more attention to in the future (Cole, 1995). Figure 
2-14. displays these actions in graphical format. Table 5 displays the data in 
tabular format. The majority of the factors identified in the study were project 
management issues, both at the design and implementation stages. 
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Future Actions 
lmpro\t!ldPM ~~~ 
Olh•r 
0% W% ~0% 60% 70% SO% 90% 100% 
FIGURE 2-I 4. ACTIONS IDENTIFIED THAT WILL BE ATTEMPTED IN THE FUTURE FOR 
PROJECTS. 
Source (Cole, 1995,Page 2) 
-Source (Cole, 1995,Page 2) 
The last question of the study (Cole, 1995) was in regards to why the project 
failed. Figure 2-15 and Table 6below show the responses to this question 
both graphically and in tabular format. Most of the factors again come back to 
the project management, and the failure to plan the project properly. 
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Rea~ons for projeclfall!ng 
Pmjoot objoo!Mlonolfullyspocifiorl ~~~~'!!1li!!!!lll:~~~5\ll 
lnadequate/noPMmothodology ~~~~:&E'~mllll~ 
ln<ulllcientseniorstolfontheteam ~~2!1~~~~llii'!';;&J 
PoorPelformaceofsuppliets E~~~~~~~~------------
- - - - - - - - - - -
FIGURE 2-15. THE IDENTIFIED REASONS FOR PROJECTS FAILING. 
-Source (Cole, 1995,Page 3) 
TABLE 6. THE REASONS IDENTIFIED FOR PROJECTS FAILING 
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2.12 CAN I Rl!COJ'ER TillS I'RO.JECT? 
Jones ( 1995) conducted a study to examine if large systems projccts arc likely 
to be cancelled and i r so why, and various other factors. lie also iLicntificJ 
some major problems tlutt can effect the project Table 7, \vhich .stage of 
project the event happened, what the triggering factors were, and the 
likc1 wad it can be rectified, both as a l'' '..:ntagc and a rating. 
TABLE 7. HOW LONG IS TOO FAR UOSE 
Development Phase Recovery Successful ! Triggering factors 
,_,__, 
I 
[l"'ospects I projects I ,,_ ' 
Early Planning Excellent 95 1X) 2.12. 1.1.1.1 Prudence 
Requirements Excellent 90(1() Sizing~~st estimating --, 
. ' I 0 
' Imtml des1gn \cry good soy;) C1cepmg n:qu1rcmcnts 
f-'DO'c"t'Ca"il-'d"'e"s"ig,.t"l-----t.OGC'o'Co"d"-----t.:6c:5c;'Y,'""---+~Cr_cc_l_'i_n_g_rc_'t_!u_ir_c~l_C_!_!_~-~__J 
Coding Fair 45% Schedules. cost c;crruns f-0"="-c------t~'-----+=---EO"--- --------
Integration Poor 30(y;) Schedules. cost OYcrruns f-00'=.="-----f~"--=-- ---t--::-~--~~"0-- -·-·C"""---
f-:OT"'e"st:ci n"'g"--"-C-----f-:V'o'ery P o.0oc_r __ +;I,;,5.:.'X::.o ____ _j S ch ed u 1 c s ~-P.9 g.!:_~l~~~!i. t;_: ___ J 
Deployment Nonexistent 0%) ~~E~9~~~_~j-~~~---- I 
Maintenance Nonexistent 0% 1 Poo~':l_l:.!~\i~)_' ----------' 
- Source (Jones, 1995, Pa!!.c 7) 
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2.13 PROBLEMS WIT/1/DENIJIFYINfi FAII.UIIE FACTO/IS. 
While this study uses two sets of f~1ctors (Cole, 1995; Flowers, ICJW,) as tiH: 
basis of the research it should be noted that they rc;lrcscnt the particular 
interpretation of each analyst. Bclassi ( 1996, Pp 142- 143) has demonstrated 
how the factors considered critical by difTcrcnt authors vary considerably 
Table 7. 
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Personnel recruitment Politics 
support 
acceptance urgency 
ment in the project 
Communication 
shooting 
ofbureaucracy Power 
Source (Belassi & Tukel, 1996, Pages 142- 143) 
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3 METHODOLOGY. 
3.1 DESIGN 
3.1.1 PLANNING 
The first part of the study was based on a semi-structured interview in which 
project manager were given a scenario based on a "disguise(," historical case 
taken from existing literature. They were asked to think about the main 
planning and management issues that they could prcdJcl which may 
complicate the project. A very simplified description of the required system 
was given. technical matters such as number of users, workstations. response 
times etc were only made available when specifically asked for. The project 
manager was free to use whatever technology, computer language. 
methodology etc that they feel comfortable using. 
3.1.2 EXPEDITING 
The second part of the study is also based on a semi-structured interview in 
which a ?rogress report was given about the disguised scenario after a certain 
period of time has elapsed in the project. Participants were asked what 
actions they as the project manager of this scenario they would likely take to 
rectify the problems faced in this situation. 
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3.2 SAMI'Ui. 
The sample consi:;;ted of eight Information Syskms professionals who have 
experience in project management within software development lick!. ·1 he 
sample was not a random one, due to the requirements set hy myself~ that is, 
the nature of the scenario, it was modeled on a very large and complex project. 
The project mangers selected for interviews must come lf·um a company, or 
have expedence in a company, that could actually undertake a project of such 
magnitude, the question of had they worked on a project of this size was not 
addressed. These requirements eliminated most possible companies who deal 
in web development and most small computer companies. 
The companies that were initially selected for canvassing had to be large 
enough to either: 
a) Have their own in-house software development team. 
b) Be in a position to commission the same development ser\'ices to other 
compames. 
From this pool of companies, each was contacted via the telephone and asked 
if they would be willing provide a project manager to participate in the study 
at a later date. 
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The linal sample contained companil!s \Vithin the a.:counting big 5 companies, 
education, computer consultancy, !inancc, and high technology n.:search. Of 
the ten interviewed project managers, only eight of the interviews were 
useable, due to tape recorder malfunctions. 
3.3 THE SCENARIO 
The scenario is based is the MANDATA project (AI'I'END/X /). This project 
was initiated in \970 and abandoned in 1981 by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government (Sauer, \993). The aim of the project was to 
centralise the Australian Public Service ( APS) records of employees. job 
records, job descriptions, payments of money, job applicants. job vacancies 
and organisational data. 
Until this project was proposed each government organization kept its 0\\'11 
records, usually in the forn1 of index sheets stored in files. The Auditor 
General had always been critical of the record keeping of these organizations. 
By centralising the records in a computerised method the savings of money 
over incorrectly maintained records would be significant. While the prcYious 
manual systems seemed simple, take the Post<! I Service, they employed 
150,000 staff, of these 1860 were employed in the employee retord keeping in 
over 400 locations across Australia (Sauer, 1993). 
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TABLE 9. REASONS WHY MANDATA FAILED. 
Sl 2ommitment of the various departments to the project. 
S2 2ontrol over the government departments to carry out tasks for the project. 
S3 T'he potential of withdrawal of departments to build their own system 
S4 T'he existence of a competing system (the Treasury was building a 
distributed payroll system). 
iSS Bureaucratic decision-making caused by the hierarchical structure of the 
body governing the project. 
S6 The need for specific resources to be assigned to the consultation processes 
between the various parties involved. 
S7 Staff shortage caused by lack of available skilled IT professionals. 
S8 Early flaws in the design which are inevitable but which need to be 
orrected. 
S9 Physical accommodation of system which was mainframe based 
SlO Delay in the supply of components from manufacturers. 
Sll Flexibility of contracts with suppliers, so that arrangements can be adjusted 
o fit progress. 
Sl2 The need for reviews to be built into the project so that early problems can 
be formally identified. 
Sl3 Economic crisis in Australia in the mid 1970s. 
Sl4 Change of government following the demise ofWhitlam. 
The reasons for MANDATA failing, as summarised by the researchers (Martin 
& Smith, 2000) after carefully reading the case study has been displayed in 
Table 9. 
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The scenario was ch;mged to disguise as many of its features as possibl!..! and 
to convert it to a J9()0's project instead of a 1970's one. The majority of the 
information about the project remained unchanged, it was assumed that the 
Sauers' ( 1993) case study was not a weB-known one. The London Amhulanct: 
Service, SABRE and TAURUS projects (Flowers, 19W1) were looked at as 
possible case studies to usc, but it was decided that these were too well known 
and some contained large technology focused areas to be effective case 
studies. 
A list of the Factors affecting the success/failure of the 'Mandata' project 
during phases of initiation and initial development ( 1971-1976 ), reported by 
Sauer (1993) and relevance to this study is avaiiablc in Appem/L"r 2. 
3.4 THE INTERVIEW 
The intenriew was designed to last approximately 40 minutes, that time broken 
down into three sections; 
a) The Planning section 
b) The Expediting section 
c) The Debrief 
Page 3-59 
IS Minutes. 
15 Minutes. 
10 Minutes. 
I 
Fuctors Ajfectiug the ,\'uccess of/ujfmtwlimt System.'i Pn~ied.\' 
One hour was requested of each project manager's time, all interviews ran 
within the allocated time limit. The entire interview apart from the debriding 
was audio recorded for later analysis. The scenario (Appendix /)was giVL:ll to 
the project manager one section at a time, and asked to say whakver they 
thought in regards to the project as they read, most prefl:rrcd to answer the 
questions as they read them. 
The debrief was introduced to answer any questions that they had about the 
case study, the research being cmTicd out, or to clear up anything they 
mentioned that wasn't too clear on during the previous two sections. They 
were also told about the real case study if they wished to know about it. 
Each interview was recorded with t:1C participants' permission. These tapes 
were then listened to by myself and brief notes were written about \\'hat ,,·as 
said by the interviewee, these were broken down into generalised statements 
about what was talked about i.e, Size of project. Technologies etc. 
Each of these general statements was then applied to the factors that Flowers 
(1996) and Cole (1995) listed in their respective literatures using a Labelling 
system ofF! toF17forthcF!owcrs'tablcandC! toCII forColcs'. When a 
statement did not fit into any of the mentioned factors, a note was made and it 
was assigned a XF or XC number. 
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This information was then transferred to a spreadsheet for analysis, no record 
was make of what order the statements were made in, nor how often they were 
repeated. The mentioning of material related to that factor once was enough 
for this study. 
3.5 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The data contained within the spreadsheet, the plan was to cross-tabulate each 
identified factor and convert it into a percentage of interviewees who 
identified that factor. Table 10 below is an example of how the factors will 
be loaded into a table and the percentage of respondents who mentioned it 
calculated. 
TAJJLE10 ANEXAMPLEOFTHEDATA WASFORMATTEDFORANALYSIS . . 
futerviewees 
I1 I2 I3 I4 IS Proportion 
Considering 
factor 
Y1 Factor 1 ,/ ,/ ,/ 60% 
Y2 Factor 2 ,/ ,/ ,/ 60% 
Y3 Factor 3 ,/ ,/ ,/ 60% 
XYl Extra Factor x ,/ 20% 
XY2 Extra Factor x+ 1 ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 80% 
It was decided to only use the data that was collected for each part in its own 
question. While many of the factors identified in each question could relate to 
each other part, it was decided to keep the data separate. 
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3.5.1 P:IH1'A. I'IANN/N(,~ 
The lltctors gathered lhm1 Part A (Planning) oftlw intcrview were 
checked against the Critical Failure Factors (Flowers, IIJIJ6) Table 2 
Flowers Crith·ul Ftlilurefactors (page 2-42 of this dissertation) us 
identified by Flowers to sec how his factors compare with those 
identified by Wesh:rn Australian software industry. 
lnfonnation on what Flowers said constitutes each of the Critical Failure 
Factors can be found in the preceding chapter "Literature Review". 
A second table was made to store all of the issues raised by the project 
managers that Flowers did not mention. The resulting two tables will 
then be combined and sorted into three sub-classifications as shown 
below in Table II. The information \\'as then ordered on percentages to 
discover which factors arc most important to the \V estern Austral ian 
software industry 
TABI.E II. PROPOSED 1./:.TEJ.S 
Least Important I Common Factors 
Important I Common Factors 
Most Important I Common Factors 
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The f~tctors can then be referenced against what I; lowers identified as his 
tltctors to sec if the intcrvicwcd project managers agree with his factors. 
No direct comparison is possible against the Fluw~,;rs ( IIJW>) factors as no 
percentages arc listed in his tabk. 2 
3.5.2 PART B. EXI'ED/11N(i. 
The factors gathered from Part 8 (Expediting) of the interview will be 
checked against the rectifying actions Table 3. Cole's rectifying actions 
(page 2~48 of this dissertation), as adopted from Cole ( 1995) to sec how 
his factors reflect upon those used within the Western Australian 
Industry. 
1 While in his 1996 book no figures arc given, in an article the fOllowing year he 
identifies which case studies had what factors. 
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A second table w:.ts m:.tdc to store HII of th~.: n;ctifying actions which wen.: 
wised by the project manag~.:rs that Cok: (I 995) did not mention. Tht.: 
resulting two tahks willtlwn hl! comhi11t.:d and sorted into thrt.:e sub-
classifications as shown above in 7'ub/e 3. This in/(mnation was tht:n 
onJercd on percentage to discovl!r which arc the more commonly used 
methods lOr expediting a late project in the Western Australian soflwan..: 
industry. Factor C 12 will not be used, the answers fi·om the second table 
could answer that, but doing so would have C 12 reading I (J(J%) in this 
study. 
With this infonnation ordered on percentages to discover what arc the 
more prevalent actions that project managers take to fix late projects 
within the Westem Australian software industry. This data was also 
checked again books on project management, in particular solhn1rc 
reiRted projects to see if they follow any trends set in literature. 
3.6 PROBLEMS WITH RESEARCH 
3.6.1 THE COMPARISONS. 
3,6./,/ PART A. 
No foreseeable problems. 
3.6.1.2 PARTB. 
A few problems arise with using this study: 
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3.6.2 1'111:' MI:TIIO/J OF INTI:'HJ"JEII": 
While little information is giVL'n on the methodology of"Coles' study, it 
docs mention that it was conducted over the telephone (Cole. I (J(J5). lt 
docs not mention if the person was given a list of likely options to pick 
from, or asked to say what they would do without any prompting. This 
study was conducted using l~lcc-to-face interviews and the participants 
were not given a list of possible actions, ruther IOrccJ to think about the 
problem with minimal interaction from the interviewer. 
3.6.3 THE TYPE OF PERSON INTERVIEWED: 
Cole ( 1995) stated that he interviewed a wide range of managers 
including CEO's, IT managers, Department managers etc. Whilst this 
research concentrated cxclusi\·cly on Information Systt:ms managers. 
who are, or have been in project management roles. in particular soft\\"arc 
development projects. This is only a problem insofar as the participants 
of this research actually arc the project managers. not the administration 
roles which Cole surveyed. 
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3.6.4 SJ:/1:" OF S.HII'/.1:": 
Is a sample ol\:ight project managers within Western Australia a l;tir 
n:presentation llfthe entire Information Systems projects environnH.:nl 
within Western Australia? The ans\\'l.;r to this question the uuthor 
believes is 'no', hut !Or a study of this proportion it was decided that the 
sample of eight would be suf'!icicnt. 
3.6.5 GEOGRAP/1/C UJCl TION: 
This is not a major issue, hut one that must be raised; the Cole ( 1995) 
study was done in the United Kingdom \\'hils! this study was conducted 
in \Vcstem Australia. This should not aficct the results, as the corrective 
actions by project managers shoulJ be \"cry similar in nature rcgan11css or 
the locution. 
3.6.6 TRA/VSCRIBING T/1£ INTERI'/EWS. 
.. ~ . • • . . "' _$-
If independent raters were to analyse the content of the interYie\\·s, thcv 
might have provided more objccli\·ity. 1-Imvc\·cr. it \\·as rcasoncU that 
adequate interpretation required familianty with the MANDATA case 
and the pmiicular interview. Only the researcher had sufficient 
familiarity to make the "ubtle judgments needed. 
--*··*--·---' .~ l.·.· - .•• · f .. 
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3,6. 7 AGF OF,\'CENAHW. 
The case study used for this study was based on I (J7(J's technology and 
practices. This typc of project would never hc done today, in those days' 
l1uge hanks ofprogranlnlers, pn1jccts that lasted years, UIJCicar 
spcdlications were all quite normal. Today, projects h:nd to he much 
shorter in duration. For instance, in web development companies tlm:l! 
months is classed as a long project. 
A more recent case study would have been better. but gaining a useful 
example proved diflicult. No org;misations that were approached \\'ere 
willing to disclose sufficient information about there failed projects to he 
of any usc. A \Vcstpac bank case (Glass. 1998) looked promising. but 
little information was available. 
3.6.8 SIMPLENESS OF SCENAR/0. 
This point was brought up in several of the intcr\'icws; the scenario was 
deliberately made simple. It was presented as summariscJ infOrmation 
totalling two pages, with this was as many factors as thought reasonably 
possible. Those two pages covered over 200 pages of material in Sauer 
(1993 ). 
I 
The proj eel mmwgcrs i n!crv i cwcd n:peatcd I y ask t.:d J( l!" fl:asi hi IiI y studies, 
budgets. information n.:quin:ml'nl statcnu.:nts, spcci fications etc. Many 
managers li.lU!ld it dirJkult to conll' to terms with tht: lite! that these Wl!l"\: 
not availabk 1\Jr perusal, stating that they tlccdcd more information lin 
some questions asked. By :tllowing project managers access to <Jtlditional 
paperwork. and ntcls the intcn·icws could of easily hccoJllC side tracked. 
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4 RESULTS . 
.f.] PART A. TilE PLlNNhVCi PROCI:SS. 
4.1.1 FWII'ERS(I996ANIJ 1997) 
The original study (Flowers .. 1996) had no percentages within it, the 
following year an article (Flowers. 1997) was published, this article had 
the factors for each case he used in his book (Appendix 5). From this 
Table 12 was created that gave a baseline for comptuison. Several of the 
identified factors changed, some were added, others deleted from the 
original study. Table 13 below shows the studies percentages against the 
categories addressed by Flowers ( 199(J, \997 ). 
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4.1.2 FLOWERS FACTORS BY INTERVIEWEES. 
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4.1.3 FLOWERS (1996;1997) COMPARED 
Table 14 above is a comparative view of both Flowers data (Flowers, 
1996, 1997) with this study. A comparison of both sets of factors was 
done, and 19 factors identified, any with N/ A meant it was missing from 
the other published list. No direct statistical comparison between the two 
is possible. 
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4.1.4 FACTORS NOT AJJDRESSED BY FLOWERS 
The below Table 15 represents all the factors which were identified by 
the interviewees which Flowers (1996; 1997) did not identify. 
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.J./.5 DI:'FINifiON.\' OF FACTORS ANJ) SJ:'LH"WJJ Ql/01"/:"S. 
The factors that w~:rc taken from the interview which diU not Ill into 
Critical Failure Factors (Flowers, 19Wl,pp IS X) Table 15 unJ haJ nc:w 
factors created an.: described below. Actual quotes have been includcd 
in bold twefaee to give an example of some of dialogue of the 
interviews, it was decided not to identify which interviewee said what. 
Fl Hosile Culture. 
"The culture of the organisations that will he using these 
things, so that would be the biggest problem I would say." 
F2 Poor reporting. 
"Until I Jwd a proper IRD (information requirements 
determination) it could not be phmued, 1 don't /mow wlto 
wants what in the organisations." 
F4 Politics. 
"Ummmm, tire go1•emmeut is wanting this run, it will most 
likely be a polilic:al minefield, pmjects ami politics don't mix 
the best." 
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FS Technology focused, 
''All/see in this pn~ject is tedwical n•quirements, what about 
the busiues,,· rules, processes that both cunently exist am/ 
pel'lwps need to be altered or aeatetl'!" 
F7 Complexity . 
.. We ojfen find that what the customer actually wwlls is far 
more complex than is stated in the requirements, or similar(r 
we read it wrong ami assume it simpler than it tu:tua/ly is." 
FS Poor consultation. 
"They should buy mther than build- they hu:k the 
experienced people to build it" 
F9 Design by committee. 
"'As long as they [thr committee] knows what itu•al11s, has 
some teclmicalullderstmu/iug of the requiremelltsfew 
problems arise, its when users change what they H'aut, or 
11011-teclmical people become iln•oh•ed that Ifiud pl'oblems 
arise." 
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FlO Technical fix for management issue. 
"lJepemlinJ.: on /omthm, we may need .... I lists many 
technological options for fixing the projl!ctj ·· 
Fll Poor procurement. 
"I tlon 't see procm·emeut beinJ.: 1111 issue It ere, while 1ve are 
using off-the-shelf components J,,,oultl hope that/ had 
im•estigated the \'em/ors before deciding 011 their product, if/ 
fwd such llprob/em I would consider uot using them in the 
fulllre again. " 
Fl2 Turnover (staff). 
"Personnel is always a problem in any project, you just hm•e 
to be reat{J' to !tire more people untl train them up as net'ded, 
mul over 7 years, you would waflf to ensure that the 
slcilllknowledge ba:rte is still there wul is passed 011" 
Fl4 Communication. 
"Get all the interested parties in ll round the table discussion, 
iron out liS many problems tiS you can as early as possible. " 
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F15 Ucadlincs. 
"all l'£'1T wdlto hm•e a rou~h set of milestones or tiuwfi·mlle, 
bill 7 .J'earsfin· anythin~ i.\· ridiculous, it should be bro/ten 
tlowu into smaller bits- tlelit•m·ah/es" 
F17 Tnlinin~. 
"They will be uble to get a new system in, but then traiuiuu 
people to use it or getting their heads around what such a 
sy.,·tem L'llll do. " 
XFI Duration I Size. This factor was in regards to the oYerall size 
and or duration of the project giYcn. It was agreed by a1\ 
participants in the interYicws that se\·en years \\·as far too long 
for a IS project. 
usel'CII yearS is lll'idicuiOIIS tliiiOilllf ojfillll', f11 t/ze S£'1/S£' that 
if you had a project so long, it may uet•erfinish am/ if it t!itl, 
what you t!elil•eretl woultl he totai(J' irrelevau t" 
XF2 Sponsorship. This factor was in regards to the o\'erall 
sponsorship issues which can arise within a project. These 
range from a champion for the project in high management to 
users supporting t:1c proposed system. 
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"Youueetl someone in hiKh llltllll1Kt!lllellllt1 be behind your 
projet·t, a duuupion as such, someone who is willint: Ill forc:e 
the clumges on reluctant parties" 
"This project woultlueetl to be owned by somebody within the 
1't'I:J' ltiglrest leJ•el of~:overument within the L'mmtry." 
XF3 Documentation of Plan. This factor is a very broad one. it 
includes feasibility studies, system requirements, project plans 
and estimations, budgets etc. In summary an documentation of 
the project. 
"where are the information requirements, the feasibility stw~r. 
this document is inadequate." 
XF4 Business Rules and Processes. This factor it could be argued 
could also come under XF3, J haye included it as a separate 
factor. The designers need to understand the \'aricty of different 
rules and processes that each and e\'CI)' business unit/ 
department has. In some cases these may need to be rc-
engineered or common rules I processes established, this would 
also effect XF:!. 
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"You hm•e I()() mid ti£'fUll'lmeuls,probab(J' each with their mvn 
H'IIJ' Oj t/tJiiiJ.: tfliJJJ.:S fru/es lllllfJU'OCC'tflll'l!S{ this H'Otlltf /u• a 
nu~jor problem tlwt would need to lw mltlressetl, wither by 
sttmdartlisiuJ.: m·Jn'OJ.:I'lllltmillJ.: eaeh entities l'llle . .,· us thq IISL' 
them." 
''All/see in this project is tee/mica/ requirements, what about 
tire business rules, proce.\·ses that both cutl'elltly exi.\'1 am/ 
perhaps ueetl to be altet'Cll or created'!" 
XFS Response Time. This factor is concerned the expected 
response times that where stated in the prc~rcqucsts. "The 
system must take no longer than it would take to manually look 
up the record in the old system. estimated at some .3- 7 
seconds.". It was widely believed this was unrealistic 
"[Said with obYious sarcasmJ Eaclt person must !tare been 
poised over their card box awaiting CllJllC!IT, it sowuls too 
ullrea/istic. " 
XF6 Geography. This factor is concerned with the geography of the 
project, i.e in this case it is "A de\'f.dOJJing, gcogmJJhica!~r 
large". The vast distances of Australia could prove some 
problems in technologically immature setting as defined in the 
Sccnari0. 
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.. G't•ogt·ttpltic:tti(J'Itii'J.:l', tlwt is ~-:oint: to JII'C'.\'t'lll some problems 
as it b;, trm•t•l ofstttjf; .\)'stems may be .vnwttl IH'el' that 
ueo~-:mpllica/locatiou also" 
XF7 Better System Knm\-·lcdgt•. This !ltctor concerns the 
knowlcdgt.: of the systems, both better knowlcUgc of: 
a) The required system, i.e. sufficient technical details. 
b) The existing systems, what is in place, what needs to be 
replaced. or can used. 
"Before going tmyfurther /would need much mol'e 
information about what ,\ystems they expect, what is curreutly 
iPI place, how do they intent! to use the new .~ystem etc." 
XFS Development Type. This factor is one considering \\'hat t;.vc 
of development will be undertaken, is it staged·- one 
department at a time. cold turkey-- i.e. the entire system is 
changed in the one instance. parallel running the new system 
and old run side by side until the old one is phased out. 
"Would probably need to build eve(rthing from the grmmd 
up, 110 computers ure there, no infrastructure .. 
XF9 Change Management. This !~tctor generally considers all 
aspects of change management that may he required. This 
includes Business Processes Rc-cnginccring. 
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"M tmy is.m es ret: a rtli IIJ.: cluw ~ e nw uu f.: em e 11 t wi II lilwly com t' 
btto this fJI't~;ect, we wmtld mll•ice tml' clients to tal/( to our 
dumge mmwJ.:emeut group about some issues." 
XFl 0 l~xisting infrastructure. This !~Lctor is concerning what the 
existing infrastructure with the country is. This is more of the 
physical infrastructure, i.e cabling, networks, computing 
facilities etc. 
''They shouhl be able to built/ their iufrastructllre, they can 
hire people to do that, it really depemls on /ww much money 
they have to .vJeml" 
"Developing country, this probably means little m· no existing 
infrastructure. " 
XFl 1 Control Issues. This fnctor is one, which cm·crs control issues 
in general, it could be ownership (bordering on SpoiJsorshipl. 
general ownership problems with some components of perth. 
XF1 2 Have done a simil:u project. This factor is one which was 
raised exclusively within the large multi-na1ional corporations 
interviewed, as they have a wide range of clients who have 
wanted many projects done, they !irs! lllOk f'or slmilar projects 
done by their company. 
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"We hm•e m1 exte11sh•e l'epository t~la/1 prt~jects our ('OIIIJNIII.J' 
lw.\· done, /would jil'sl search that j(n· similttr pn~jt•cts, om· 
[JI'(~jects thatlun•e similtu'ftlciOI'S," 
XFI3 Excess Staff. This factor is co11cerning the excess staff both in 
the project teams and in the organisations being worked on. 
"Quite fl'ighteniug, when you too/( at the Jlllmbers of people 
employed in doing tiling that are all doue automatical(r now" 
XF14 Team breakdo"""· This factor is concerning the make-up or 
structure of the team that works on the project, this could also 
include internal politics within your own project team. 
XF15 Why I justification. This factor addresses \\"lwt is the re.:~son 
for the project? Why do we need it? \Vhat bcnc!its will come 
out of it? Who decided we needed it? Arc some of the possible 
questions that could be raised here, some of this could be oYer-
lapping with XF3, though the below quote promptc:d me to 
separate it. 
"What is the reason for this project, what do they hope to 
achieve, the government just wanting it is not reason enough" 
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4.1.6 ALLPAllTA FACTORS AS FOUND. 
The following Table 16 represents all of the factors, both the ones 
identified by Flowers and the ones identified by the interviewees in this 
study. The responses have been ranked on the percentage of respondents. 
TABLE 16. ALL P AllT A ANSWERS IN ORDER 
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4.2 PART B. THE ExPEDITING PROCESS. 
This section reports the results as found for Part B (Expediting) of this study. 
4.2.1 COLES ACTIONS IDENTIFIED IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Table 17 below displays the factors which Cole (1995) identified as the 
actions which project managers in the Information Systems industry are 
likely to undertake to rectify a late project. These were assigned 
percentage in the text, which were placed in the Expected, and the 
Findings columns 
TABLE 17. COMPARISON OF COLE AGAINST MARTIN 
4.2.2 FACTORS COLE DID NOT ADDRESS 
This section contains the expediting actions identified by the 
interviewees which were not addressed by Cole (1995). This data is 
displayed below in Table 18. 
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TABLE 18. FACTORS NOT ADDRESSED BY COLE 
4.2.3 ALL PART B FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
This section details all the expediting actions identified ordered on 
percentage of respondents who identified that action. Table 1.9 displays 
this information in tabular format. 
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4.2.4 DEFINITIONS AND ELECTED QUOTES 
The factors that were created from the interviews which did not fit into 
the existing rectifying actions (Cole, 1995) are described below; as well 
as quotes from the interviews. 
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Ct Extending the Schedule. , 
"We ctm alway.\· allocate more time to completion date ({we 
hm•e to, most prt~jects I hm•e been in have done it." 
C2 Better Pro,ject Management Procedures. 
"I would examine the c:urreut way the prt~ject {project in 
trouble/ is managed, is it too lengthy on papenvork, too 
laid back with little supervision elL', /IIlli)' need to c/umge 
some p;actices now, or in my next project." 
C3 More People. 
"We can always hire some tempotm)' people to do some work 
later in the project if ueed be" 
CS Pressure on Suppliers Payment. 
"Look at changing suppliers if the don't petform, look for 
other.\' who have a similar prmluct" 
C6 Reduction in Project Scope. 
"Change the scope t~f the pn~;ect ltJ jit into tlte time 
ai/Gcated." 
"If a project 11ppeo:t·s like it H'i/1 run .for Ol'l'l' 6 mouths, ll't' 
c/umge its scope so /!tat it fits into a 6 moutlt tim£' .fimuc'. " 
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C7 New Outside Help. 
"We can alway.\· hire some tempomry people to do some work 
later;, the project if need be, e . ,pedully if the hm'e some skills 
om· present team lacks." 
CS Better Developmeut Methodolgies. 
"Our initial requirements were way out, int•estigate this :was 
we don't do it again" 
C9 Pressure Suppliers by Litigation. 
"/would al'()id tltreuteuing with legal action at this stage, if I 
don't get urespouse theu its em avenue 1/wl'l! that I can 
take." 
Cll Abandoning the Project. 
"With the got'erumeut being 1m-supportive, we lll'e pushing 
shit uphill f . .. j we may liS well abandon it now, it all depends 
oil the gQt'el'lllltellt" 
Page 4-87 
F11ctors Ajf'ectiug the Succe.,·s ofll~f'm·mtllhm .\)•stems l'n~ieds 
XCI Staff Issues. This l~1ctor is concerned all staffing issues of thc 
project team, recruitment, incentives, moral imU stafTturnovcr. 
"Its no use tl)'ing to pay them jyour Majj] more tJr ~:h•e them a 
holiday to get your slippage under control, thi.\· would only be 
a s/IOJ't term solution" 
"Need to .find out why the mont/ of the team is low .. " 
"Find out why staff moral is low, is it work, personal, the 
project, etc. " 
XC2 Stockholder Issues. This factor is concerning the stockholders 
of the projects, and any concems or issues that they may have, 
or any issues that the project manager may ha\'C with them. 
1
'They may be losing their Jlel'l'e a little bit, there is 110 rea sou 
panic by single entities. (iu re~pouse to tlepts. Going their owu 
way) That's what this sounds like to me." 
XC3 Slippage Concerns. This factor concerns all slippage matters, 
arc they concerned about them. at what point to they worry. 
analysis of how they got hat far behind in the first place. 
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"/Is IW use tl)'iug to pay them jyour stuff] mm·e orgil'e litem a 
holiday to gel yow· •tlippage umler ctmtrol, this would only be 
a short term solution" 
"We hm•e been going for 2 years tml of 7, a little behind, not 
till issue yet. We hm1e 4 ~years to catch up." 
XC4 Adju~t I redo plan. This factor is in regards to the project plan. 
and typically is closely tied to XC3 as a result of slippage the 
plan may need to be altered I adjusted. If the project is 25%, late 
at present, does that mean we assume the rest of the project \viii 
be at least 25% late also and adjust the plan accordingly. 
"If you got to that stage ami you were that far out, I think you 
woulc/ defiuite()'Ueed a complete reJ•iew of the time frame" 
XCS Management issues. This factor t)1Jically \\'<IS used by the 
project managers when the decision was too difficult for them 
(the contractual issues were mentioned in here), they would 
pass the entire issue onto their management. or if a particular 
department was being difficult consult with that departments 
management. 
"It neetls /(}be maunged so that staff can h•m•e tit£• pn~iect am/ 
tile entire pn~;eclwont be e.ffet't£'d, people should be able to he 
repluced, its good mtmagemeut structm·e." 
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XC6 Contract reviews. This factor was when the project manager 
did not pass the contractual obligations onto their supervisors. 
It was typically used for future reference, i.e. if Company 1\ is 
late delivering components then look into them in more detail in 
future, incorporate penalty clauses etc. 
"The project is far more difficult than lit first tltouJ.:IIt, we nwy 
ueed to renegotiate the requirements." 
"Review the commct carefully, elm they clumge the 
requirements as the want, or is it fixed, if they ca11 chllnge it 
freely, plan 011 14 years" 
XC7 Risk assessment. This factor concems risk assessment of this 
and future projects, this area was deliberately left lacking in 
this study. By identifying what can go wrong. and the likely 
hood of that happening before the project some plans can be 
made to plan the "what if' contingencies. 
"The change ofgm•emlltellt is a big factor, it is probably 
coutributiug to the other problems, we should lun·e idelltified 
that liS a risk early ou." 
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XC8 Never ubandon project. This fltctor is concenll!d with the 
"We will never quit" mentality, this can he lOr i.l variety of 
reasons from a project manager naive lx:lier he can complctl: the 
project to a corporate policy of never abandoning a project. 
XC9 Resign. This factor addresses what some project managers 
would do when faced with such a pro~cct as the one used in the 
scenario, upon running a test interview with an engineering 
project manager, it was his only response. 
11thiuk I will hand in my resignation." 
XCIO Better initial planning. This factor addresses more of what 
could be done following projects rather than this one. while it 
may be to late now to plan the overall project more carefully. in 
future the lessons learnt from this experience may be beneficial. 
"Something, a phm m· scltetlule to say wltllt ll't! ll'ould delil'er 
and wlleu." 
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5 DISCUSSION. 
While percentages arc used in this section, they arc used only as a guide, no 
direct comparison between the studies is possible. Only generalised 
statements on the factors that the participants identified can be made. 
Flowers ( 1996; 1997) study was done post project and examined the reasons 
why the project failed, while this study attempted to capture what project 
managers considered to be potential problems which could arise during the 
project. 
The Cole (1995) study was conducted using a different format from this study, 
one that was not well described in the article. It consistct.l of rectifying actions 
which had taken place within that organisation, whilst this study asks "What 
will you do''" 
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5.1. QIIE\'1'/0N I. 
"Whtlt are thefaL·tors that projeL'f lllllllliMl!l'.\' consider beiug the most 
important wheu they m·e e!•aluatiug or planning Information Systems 
project with large software composition?" 
Table 16 in the preceding chapter, has for readability been reproduced here 
and br0ken down into Tables 20, 21 and 22 which represent the factm· 
which project managr.rs in Westem Australia consider to be important, 
critical or relevant. 
5.1.1. MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS. 
From the study, II factors were categorized in the "Jl!ostlmportan(' 
(Table 20) type. All of the project managers identified that the size or 
duration of the project (Duration I si:e and Ge' )graphy) \\'Crc of major 
concem to them, that is, the longer it is expected to run. the greater the 
chance of failure. 
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Many issues in regards to the organization were found, these being the 
understanding I misunderstanding of what organization requires, and 
how it presently works (Business rules I processes), the need for strong 
support from both within the organization and a powerful sponsor 
(Sponsorship), with this instrument in place the difficult political and 
organizational culture factors (Politics and Hostile Culture) may be 
lessened. 
One issue that was raised was to do with project management 
techniques primarily, this was the factor concerning documentation of 
the plan (Documentation of plan), this aimed at ensuring the required 
system is understood and well planned. (Business rules I processes) 
also overlaps with this project management area, i.e. they need to 
understand the current system before the tinker with it. 
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The last area of issues of most importance to the project managers were 
the technical aspects, those associated with high-technology, how will 
we do it, how fast can we do it etc (Technical fzx, Technology focused 
and Response time). They tend to get concentrate on the technology, 
and forget the reason why the technology was being used. 
5.1.2. iMPORTANT FACTORS. 
The 11 factors that were categorized as those belonging to the 
"hnportant" type of factors are displayed below in Table 21. 
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The majority of the factors idcntilicd in the important category can he 
directly associated to tht: org~•nization which the project will he 
conducted. Mon: infbrmation is ullcnnccth.:d (IJclfer syste111 
kno\\'lcdge) in regards to both the requirements f(H the new system and 
the existing system. including hardware I inli'astructurc (F:xisting 
il({i·as/ructurc and Complexity underestimated). The type of 
development (/Je\•elopmenttype) issue was also raised, that is, is it 
parallel, immediate switchovcr to new system. this also took into 
account any methodologies the project managers mentioned. 
The communications area was also covered in some detail, while some 
of these factors could also be in the proceeding organizational 
paragraph. Communication inside both the organisation and the 
project team were mentioned, although not as many project managers 
mentioned this as was expected (Commu11ication). Other 
communication issues raised were the need for training. both on a \!.!am 
and organisational level (Training) and the probable need for ')O!l1C 
support ifre-engineering or proces3 change is required (Change 
management). The last factor in this group is the lack of feedback or 
lax reporting (Poor Reporting) within both the organisation and the 
team. 
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The factors that arc Jell that do not !it into the above areas arc those 
which involve new or untried technology (J,urc of leading edge), i ncpt 
or insunicicnt consultation by the project staff(Poor consultation) and 
finally issues about getting off the she! f components purchased and 
delivered (Poor procurement). 
5.1.3 LEAS1"1MJ>OR7"ANT FACTO/IS. 
The following 1 0 factors as displayed in Table 22 represent what was 
categorised as the "Least Important" factors that project mangers 
considered. 
TABLE 22 LEAST IMPORTANT FACTOR~' . .. 
Least Importaut 
Control Issues 25% 
Have done a similar Project 25% 
Turnover (stafO 25% 
Competency 13% 
Design by committee 13% 
Excess staff 13% 
Team breakdown 13% 
Testing 13% 
Why I justification 13% 
Over Commitment 0% 
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Many of these mentioned factors arc concerning the project team itself, 
one question asked by 2 of the interviewees was "I lave we done a 
similar project in the past?" (!lave done a similar l)rr~ject) if' they had, 
they would look up the particulars on that project. Staffing problems 
were addrcsscU (Competency, 'limwver (stajj), F •. xcess st(df and Team 
breakdown) by a very few project managers, they seemed to assume 
that they would always have the required staff as needed. 
In the organisation, issues as to ownership, control of information, 
hardware, procedures etc was addressed (Contra/Issues). In this 
particular scenario the presented case was a govemmcnt agency with 
complex requirements which had been decided by committees and sub-
committees, this factor (Design hy committee) was only addressed by 
one participant. The question of why is the project being conducted 
(Why I justification) was also raised, with the argument that just 
because the government wants it is not reason enough. 
The commitment (Over Commitment) factor (Flowers, 1996, 1997) 
was not addressed at all by any of the participants, could this be proof 
that Wef:.tem Australian workers arc not prone to working more than 
necessary or simply that none of the participants considered the issue 
important. 
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5.2. QUESl'/ON 2. 
"f/oJI' at·cumte are the c•xi.\·ting litemture.\· 011 this IIJpic as c:outmsted against 
the tlata col/e,·tetlfrom projeL'f mtuwgers within the Western Austra/icm 
iudusiiJ' 011 what they consider to be important?" 
The results of this study will be compared against those critical factors as 
identified in Flowers ( 1996; 1997) 
Flowers. 
While as previously mentioned, the original quotation of this study (Flowers. 
1996) contained no percentages, on a paper the following year (Flowers, 1997) 
he identified which case studies had what failure factors. using this data 
percentages for Flowers Critical factors were produced Table 3./. Flowers 
(1997) latest factors brealulowu (Page 6-134 of this dissertation). While some 
discrepancies are evident between the two sources\\ !th factors missing and 
others added it was decided to usc the figures produced. 
Tt~ble 23 below displays the Flowers Critical Failure factors, the percentage of 
Flowers (1996; 1997) studies and the actual figures identified by this study. 
Only the factors addressed by Flowers arc in the table. 
TABLE 23. FI.OWERS (1996)(1997) Vs MARTIN 
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The first and obvious fact by looking at figures is the vast difference 
between Flowers and Martin. While the overall average difference is ve1y 
small it does not represent the difference fairly, and thus was omitted from 
this table. 
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5.2.1. SAM/;· A.\' EXI'HTHIJ. 
);- F8. Poorconsu\tation. 
).- F17. Training. 
From the data collected that were the smnc as expected it can he 
concluded that project managers \vi thin Western Australia arc 
comparable to those in the United Kingdom in the areas of foreseeing 
problems with training and Poor consultation. 
5,2.2. GREATER THAN EXPECTED • 
.,. Fl. Fear based I Hostile Culture. 
~ F4. Politics. 
., FS . Technology focused. 
.,. F7. Complexity underestimated . 
.,. Fl 0. Technical Fix sought. 
,. F19. Development type. 
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Fmm the data collected that were grc<:~ter than expected it can he 
concluded that project managers within WL:stcrn Australia an.: more 
conscious of the culture of' the organisation, the political battles that 
occur, aware that technology is often used to lix managerial problt.:ms, 
systems complexity is often undcrt.:stimatcd, and they arc mon.: awan.: 
of' the development type than their counterparts in the United Kingdom. 
5.2.3. LESS 11/AN EXPECTED. 
> F2. Poor Reporting. 
,. F3. Over Commitment. 
'r F6. Lure or Leading Edge. 
> Fll. Poor I weak procurement. 
,_. FlS. Deadlines I Project timetable slippage. 
;. F16. Testing . 
.,.. F18. Changing requirements. 
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From the data collected that were less than expected it can be 
concluded that project managers within Wt.:sh.:m Australia are more 
used to companies who have better rcporllllg structures, whosl: workers 
arc not known for their over commitment, project compotH.:nts arc not 
state ol"thc art or leading edge technology, they suffer less problems 
with procun:mcnt of hardware when needed, less prone to deadline and 
timetable slippage, do less testing. and have the system requirements 
changed less frequently than do those project managers in the United 
Kingdom. 
5.2 • ./.. FLOWERS, NO FIGURE AVAILABLE. 
}- F9. Design by committee. 
" 
F12. Staff turnover. 
" 
F13. Competency. 
r F14. Communication. 
No comparisons can be done on these four factors, nor any of factors 
identified which Flowcrs(l996; 1997) did not address in his Critical 
Failure Factors. 
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This set of factors, it is believed by the author is not a good reference 
point to start from when looking at what makes or breaks a project. He 
(Flowers) missed 5 of the 11 factors (Table 20) identified in this study 
as Most Important ones within Western Australia (Table 24). 
Most of Flowers factors were ranked in the Important (Table 21) and 
Least Important (Table 22) categories in this study. Even in the 
Important category there were 4 factors identified that he failed to 
mention. 
While many factors were shown, it is the belief of the author that the 
existing critical failure I success factors in circulation as inadequate for 
the Western Australian industry. The factors addressed by Flowers 
(1996) are by far the best that could be found for this study, it is far 
closer than any other collection of factors that were found. 
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5.3. QU/:'.\'1'/0N 3. 
"What til'£' the most commmJiy used rectifyinM aL·tiou ... · that a project 
nuuWM£'1' is lif1e~)' to illlrmluce to e.\]Jl!tlite a late or trouh/etiJU't~ject within 
/h(• Information ~)·stems iudusiJ]'?" 
Table 19 in the preceding chapter, has !Or readability been reproduced here 
and broken down into Table 25, Table 26, anJ Table 27 which n.:prcscnt the 
most commonly used expediting actions which project managers in Western 
Australia usc to rectify troubled projects. 
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5.3.1. MOST COMMON EXPEDITING ACTIONS. 
From the study, 13 actions were categorised in the "Most Common" 
(Table 25) type. All of the project managers identified the need to put 
in additional resources to the project (Extending the Schedule, More 
Funds, More People), these three actions could ultimately be broken 
down to simply "More Funds" as adding people or time ultimately 
comes down to spending more money. They also identified the need 
for refinement of their project management procedures I policies for 
both this project and future projects (Better Project Management 
Procedures). All pa1iicipants also recognised that staffing issues were 
critical to their projects (Stafflssues), these include recruitment, moral, 
stress, etc,. 
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Some actions whidt concern the running or the project were 
discovered, reducing t!H~ cxpeelations I n:quirt.!lllCtl\S I ddiverahll:s or 
the project (Beller DevL:Llpmcnl MLlhodolobics) w;1;; addn:s';ed hy 
several participants, delays in the project (slippage concern) time-line 
was discussed with some project managers and snnH.: managers hrought 
up the need to adjust the project plan to rclh::ct the changes in the 
project (Adjust I redo plan), some issues over wither to change the 
entire project time-line to renee! the current delays, or simply to replan 
those late activities were brought up in this stage. The decision to cut 
ones losses and abandon the project (Abandoning the Project) \Vas also 
discussed. 
Some identified actions were ca!L'gonscd a.s management issues. that is, 
issues that the project mana~~. ''"lhl'l f may not haYc Ill deal \\·ith 
(though he may han.· Ill), ratiKT In:. !ll;ma~LT m;ut.J~~cmcnt team. 
While the project manager may interact \\ 11h tilL' ';todJHlldns 
(Stockholder issues). somctilllL'S lm.!hcr lnana~~.:m~.:IJ! nla\· m:cd to 
- - . 
become involved. particui<Jrly if' the pro,icct manager is the problem. 
this category also included normal stockholder reports and meetings. 
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The need to fmd both experienced replacement staff and consultants to 
the project who can perform any desired task may fall upon upper 
management (New Outside Help), an example could be an auditor to 
check the progress of the project. If suppliers fail to supply the deliver 
their orders on time, some pressures, contractual, legal, financial and 
promises to cancel contracts (Pressure on Suppliers Payment) may be 
required, of the project managers interviewed, those who brought this 
up said they would personally not do this, their management would. 
5.3.2. COMMON EXPEDITING ACTIONS. 
The 3 actions that were categorised as belonging in the "Common" 
type of actions are displayed below in Table 26. 
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The Conimon actions are all in the management roles, the area of 
general overall management comes up (Management issues), while 
covered in the "Most Common actions" it comes up here with different 
management issues more suited to the project managers level. The 
scenario brought some problems in procurement and supply, this was 
addressed by some participants and they mentioned a process of 
reviewing contracts to see exactly what the term were (Contract 
reviews), this applied to both vendor and themselves. The last action in 
this category is continuous risk assessment (Risk assessment), while 
risk assessment should happen before the project, it should also be an 
on-going procedure. 
5.3.3. LEAST COMMON EXPEDITING ACTIONS. 
The following 5 actions were categorized "Least Common" from the 
study are displayed below in Table 27. 
TABLE 27. LEAST COMMONLY USED EXPEDITING ACTIONS. 
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Must or these actiuns are to do tl!rectly with the project, ii>r instance 
hctkr planning ror any project rrom the start in future (!kiter initial 
planning), this wun't help this project, hut will assist in hetter 
management of future ones. Changing they selected technologies of a 
project (Change of Technology) to usc sonH.: new, ollcn untl!stcd 
technology. While previously "AbanDoning the project" was 
discussed. this action (Never abandon project) was addn:sscd hy 
project managers whose companies often take on troubled projects and 
never abandon a project or resign from difficult projects (Resign). 
While pressure on suppliers and contract review have be discussed 
previously, this action (Pressure Suppliers by Litigation) is pressure on 
them by litigation or threat of it. 
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5A .. (!UJCSHON .f. 
"/-1 o II' accllrate urc tlte reuwtlie.\' icleutified in Jlre exi.\·tiiiJ.: literalllre for late 
m· tnmblt•d pn4eL'fs 11s coutrasted llJ.:lliu.\·t tile likely remedies as identified 
by prl~it!cl mtmllgers within the Western Au.'ilmlitm imlllstiJ'!" 
Cole. 
While Coles (1995) study is significantly different than this study in seven~ I 
ways, size, collection technique, location, type of participant etc it was 
decided that they could be compared. On this assumption it was decided that 
(in absence of evidence to prove otherwise) the percentages of Cole were the 
percentage of participants who listed that action as imponanl. Using this 
idea the figures of this study should be generally rcprcscntatiYc of a greater 
sample. The figures used arc as a guide only, no statistical analysis is 
possible. 
Table 28 below displays the 11 (12 including other) actions which Cole 
(Cole, 1995) states arc actions project managers arc likely to take to bring a 
run-away project into control again and the percentage of participants who 
address those conccms (Expected), compared against what this study round 
(Fimliug). 
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While the percentages are not directly comparable statistically (as stated 
previously) they will compared against each other to indicate if this studies 
results are similar to that of Cole. 
From this data, as well as the 10 actions not identified by Cole (1995) the 
actions will be placed into the below four headings: 
5.4.1. SAME AS EXPECTED 
No actions fitted into this section. 
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S..J.1. GRI:"A'J'J:'Il 1'1/AN E.\'I'I:'C1HJ. 
All of the actions matched against Cole (J!J<>S) in this study fell into 
this section. 
From this fact one could say that project managers in Western 
Australia arc better at handling run-away project than thosl: of their 
United Kingdom co!league~. This could also be explained away as the 
fact that this study surveyed project managers only. where as Cole did 
a variety of high management positions. 
One fact that is predominant in this study is that all project managers 
still pour more resources, man-power in particular into ntn-a\Yay 
projects. This conflicts greatly with Brook's Law (Brooks. 1975) 
\vhich states that you don't add man-power to a late so!'Lware project. 
5.4.3. LESS THAN EXPECTED 
No actions fitted into this section. 
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5.4.4. NOT EXPECTED AT ALL. 
Table 29 below is a reproduction of Table 18 which was brought here 
for readability. The list has been broken down into Importance levels 
as it was for Coles' (1995) actions. 
TABLE 29. ACTIONS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COLE. 
This information was previously been covered, it is surprising XCl, 
XC2, and XC3 were omitted from Coles work. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS. 
The results of this study show tlwt experienced ProjL:ct Managcrs rt.:adi ly 
identify most of the likely JOn.;sccablc prci:Jkms that could arisl! when giv<.:n 
the task of developing a largl! Information Systems project. Those factors 
raised closely mirror those factors addressed by Flowers'( 199(J; 19lJ7) General 
factors underlying Information Systems Failures, as well as the specific factors 
identified in a post hoc analysis of the Mandata scenario as reported in Sauer 
(1993). 
Most of the factors (89%) !!ddrcssed by Flowers' ( 1996; 1997) in the planning 
stage were identified by the project managers within this st~Idy, Table 23 on 
page 5-99 of this dissertation shows the difference between the studies. 
Within the Western Australian sample the trend shows that th!.!rc arc kss 
testing, reporting, rt:quiremcnts changes, deadline issues than thosl! in the 
United Kingdom. Altemativcly the Western Australian sample had more 
emphasis on technology, politics, hostil~ cultures, under-estimation of 
complexity and more prone to looking for technical fixes for management 
\SSUCS. 
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This studies participants also raised some issues which J;lnwt.:rs( I <)I)(); I <J<J7) 
lltilcd to mention, some of those arc; 
,. Duration I Size of project 
;... Sponsorship from uppcr manag<:Jlll'llt. 
,. Documentation of plan. 
,. Business rules I Business processes of existing business. 
,. Geography, the vast distance involved. 
,. Better knowledge of existing and desired systems. 
The project managers in this study had all their responses listed and make into 
a table so that it could Uc seen which f.:~ctors they thought most important. The 
results of this arc in Table 16 on page 4-82 of this dissertation. In sUI11lll<U)' 
they considered the duration most important (I 00% of respondents) fol[o\\·ed 
by Deadlines, Politics and Sponsorship ( 88%1), then Business rules/ 
processes. Documentation, Hostile culture. Tcchnicc'.l fix and Technologically 
focused (75%) 
From this study it shows that project managers have no problem forecasting 
possible problems which may interrupt, hamper or disrupt their projects. 
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Similarly. ror n.::m~:dial expediting actions that a project manager could usc 
when a prn_ject is in diniculty. the study showt:d that tht: proj~:ct m_:.magL:rs 
consith:rcd a wide range of measurt:s to both managL: the current problem as 
wc\1 as cont.:1in any future problems which could arist: bccausL: of it. All of the 
[lctors cited in Cole ( 1995) were mldrcsscd by the pn~ject managers withing 
this study. ini11ct in all categories the lindings cxcecdt."'tl the expected Table 17 
on page 4-83 of this dissertation shows the comparisons. While the studies 
cannot be directly compared due ~o the nature and size of each study, the 
results can be used as a general indicator. 
Other issues were raised that could not be classified into the Cole (1995) 
factors, these were factors such as; 
,.. Staffing Issues 
,.. Stock Holder Issues 
,.. Concems over Slippage of deadlines 
,.. Adjustment I redoing the project plall 
The 'mythical man-month' fallacy as written by Brooks (1975) was not found 
to be true in this study. All eight experienced project managers Jidn 't hesitate 
to add more fuel to the fire by adding more man power to the late project. 
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Returning to th~ original qu~..:stinn: Why do systt.:ms t:uhn~..:s in the ln!Cmwttion 
Systems industry continue to occur with the san H.: recurring factc>rs'! 'I hese 
prcsl.!nt results were compiled hy analy1.ing tbt: knowll!dgt: of a fl!w, yt:t highly 
experienced lnli.mnation Systems pn~j~..:ctmana~ers. !-'rom lht.: data collr.:ctl!d it 
tentatively sugg~sts thut th~..: reason the Information Systems projects fail is not 
because the project managl.!rs cannot identify the likely problems in advance. 
This suggests that the problem lies elsewhere, a Jack of experienced project 
managers. the project factors are not known before hand or the fctctors 
involved are non-controllable hy the project manager. 
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8. APPENDIX I. THE MANDATA PRO.JECT. 
PART A) 
A developing, geographically large, newly democratic government has in its wisdom 
decided to implement a pmjcct that wi!\ change the way the govcmmc:nt administ~:rs 
certain aspects of some departments. 
At present the country's main service industries, Telephone, Utilities, Postal Service, 
Public Transport arc all government owned. There arc rumours of some privatisation 
of these services in the ncar future. As well as these services there is a main 
govenunent office and each of the country's 8 regions also has a regional government. 
At present, the pay records, employee records, job descriptions etc arc located in each 
department's location. Clerks are employed to update staff and pay records. Mostly 
paper index cards to store the data. This task alone employs many people; and many 
mistakes arc made costing the government vast sums of money. 
Using a typical example: the Postal Service has 150,000 staff members. Of these. an 
estimated 1860 fui\Mtime staff, in over 400 separate locations, arc dedicated to the 
keeping of personnel records. 
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ThL' government has made a new departmcnt, the Public Service Management 
Department to develop a way for the government to centralise all or its administrative 
functions like pay, vacancies, ami employment details, to ~:avc moJH..:y aml mak<.: the 
process more e!licicnt. 
An initial feasibility study has been done, ami some interim planning. An initial 
estimate of7 years has been made (total project dur:.hion), this being due to the 
complexity of design, and the time to develop new technologies that at present do not 
exist. 
To summarise some of the main requirements. 
The system must be ultra-secure. The government is concerned to avoid 'leaking 
infommtion'. The specification calls for all transactions to cncr)vtcd at a very high 
bit count. This encryption software needs to be developed. 
The system must be usable by clerks located all over the country in different 
departments of govcnunent on a real time basis. 
The system must take no longer than it would take to manually look up the record in 
the old system, estimated at some 3 - 7 seconds. 
The system must be Ocxible enough to add/remove components or the programs as 
needed. For example, to handle changes in employment law or award rates. 
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The system must he easily understood hy the end user and work under a commonly 
de tined operating system. 
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PART B) 
The project is now been running for two years, a number of problems havt: arisen: 
Looking at the projects plan, you sec that at the two year mark you should he much 
further forward than you arc. The level of work done matches what should have been 
completed by 18 months. 
The moral of your key project staff is low, ami you have staff leaving the project for 
other jobs. 
Software and hardware components are being delivered late or occasionally not at all. 
The system for pay grades of public servants and their leave components is far more 
complicated than at first thought, this is due to each department personal ising their 
own pay system. 
Several departments who were initially involved in the project have changed their 
minds. They are not willing to wait on the system as it is taking too long and docs not 
meet their needs. They are opting towards developing their own systems. An 
argument they are using is they arc looking at privatisation. 
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A new government has been elected, one who does not as supportivt; as the pn.:virJtJS 
one. Government bodies arc investigating the project and generally upsetting the starr 
involved in the projcd. 
As the project manager in charge of this project, what possible actions could you 
foresee yourself doing to bring the runaway project hack under contr'JI'! 
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9. APPENDIX 2. MANDATA FAILURE FACTORS 
Table 30 Factors affecting the success/failure of the 'Mandata' project during phases 
of initiation and initial development (1971-1976), adapted from Sauer (1993), Table 
31, shows which factors the iuterviewees addressed during the study. 
TAJJLE 30 MANDATA FAILURE FACTORS 
S1 Commitment of the various departments to the project. 
S2 Control over the government departments to carry out tasks for the project. 
S3 The potential of withdrawal of departments to build their own system 
S4 The existence of a competing system (the Treasury was building a 
distributed payroll system). 
S5 Bureaucratic decision-making caused by the hierarchical structure of the 
body governing the project. 
S6 The need for specific resources to be assigned to the consultation processes 
between the various parties involved. 
S7 Staff shortage caused by lack of available skilled IT professionals. 
S8 Early flaws in the design which are iuevitable but which need to be 
corrected. 
S9 Physical accommodation of system which was mainframe based 
S10 Delay in the supply of components from manufacturers. 
Sll Flexibility of contracts with suppliers, so that arrangements can be adjusted 
to fit progress. 
S12 The need for reviews to be built into the project so that early problems can 
be formally identified. 
S13 Economic crisis in Australia in the mid 1970s. 
S14 Change of government following the demise ofWhitlam. 
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TABLE 31 SAUERS' FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN INTERVIEWS/ 
Interviewees 
II I2 I I3 I4 IS I6 I7 I IS proportion 
Years of experience in IT/IS field 21 17 10 18 21 !4 I 26 I Is considering factor 
Sauer's factors Vs interviews 
Sl ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 100% 
S2 ,/ ,/ ,/ 38% 
S3 ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 88% 
S4 0% 
ss ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 63% 
S6 ,/ ,/ ,/ 38% 
S7 ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 50% 
S8 ,/ 13% 
S9 0% 
SIO ,/ 13% 
Sll ,/ 13% 
S12 ,/ ,/ ,/ 38% 
S13 0% 
F14 ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 88% 
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10. APPENDIX 3. FLOWERS COMPARSONS 
TABLE 32 RAW DATA FOR PART A . . 
Interviewees 
I1 I2 B I I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 proportion 
Years of experience in IT/IS field 21 17 10 I 18 21 14 26 15 considering factor 
Critical Failure Factors, FLOWERS (1996) 
Fl5 Deadlines ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 88% 
F4 Politics ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 88% 
Fl Hostile Cult ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 75% 
FlO Technical fix. ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 75% 
F5 Technology focused. ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 75% 
F7 Complexity underestimated ./ ./ ./ ./ 50% 
F8 Poor consultation ./ ./ ./ ./ 50% 
Fl7 Training ./ ./ ./ ./ 50% 
Fl4 Communication ./ ./ ./ 38% 
F6 Lure ofleading edge ./ ./ ./ 38% 
Fll Poor procurement ./ ./ ./ 38% 
F2 Poor Reporting ./ ./ ./ 38% 
Fl2 Turnover (staff) ./ ./ 25% 
Fl3 Competency ./ 13% 
F9 Design by committee ./ 13% 
Fl6 Testing ./ 13% 
F3 Over Commitment 0% 
Other factors not in Flowers 
./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 100% 
Sponsorship ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 88% 
Documentation of plan ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 75% 
Business rules I processes ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 75% 
Response time ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 63% 
Geography ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 63% 
Better system knowledge ./ ./ ./ ./ 50% 
Development type ./ ./ ./ 38% 
Change management ./ ./ ./ 38% 
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Existing infrastructure 
" " " 
38% 
Control Issues 
" " 
25% 
Have done a similar Project 
" " 
25% 
Excess staff 
" 
13% 
Team breakdown 
" 
13% 
Why I justification 
" 
13% 
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11. APPENDIX 4. COLES COMPARISONS. 
TABLE33 RAWDATAFORPARTB . 
Interviewees 
II I2 I I3 I4 IS I6 I7 I I8 proportion 
Years of experience in IT/IS field 21 11 I 10 18 21 14 26 I 15 considering factor 
COLES FACTORS (Cole, 1995) 
C2 Better PM. Procedures v" v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 100% 
Cl Extending Schedule v" v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 100% 
C4 More funds v" v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 100% 
C3 More staff v" v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 100% 
C6 Scope change v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 88% 
C8 Better Dev. Methodologies v" v" v" v" v" v" 75% 
Cll Abandoning Project v" v" v" v" v" 63% 
C7 New Outside Help v" v" v" v" v" 63% 
C5 Pressure on Suppliers v" v" v" v" v" 63% 
ClO Change of technology v" v" 25% 
C9 Litigation v" v" 25% 
OTHER FACTORS 
Staff Issues v" v" v" v" v" v" v" v" 100% 
Stockholder issues v" v" v" v" v" v" 75% 
Slippage concern v" v" v" v" v" v" 75% 
Adjust I redo plan v" v" v" v" v" 63% 
Management issues v" v" v" v" 50% 
Conh·act reviews v" v" v" v" 50% 
Risk assessment v" v" v" 38% 
Never abandon project v" v" 25% 
Resign v" v" 25% 
better initial planning v" v" 25% 
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12. APPENDIX 5. FLOWERS FAILURE FACTORS 
IDENTIFIED BY CASE 
TABLE 34 FLOWERS (1997) LATEST FACTORS BREAKDOWN 
LAS PRS Taurus Wessex I TFS Confrrm I% 
a. Organisational Context 
Fear Based Culture y 
- I - y I - y I 50% 
Poor reporting Stmctures y y IY y I - y I 83% 
b. Management of Pro· ect 
Overcormnitment y y IY y I - - I 67% 
Political pressures . 
-
- IY y IY - I 50% 
c. Conduct of Project 
Technology focused y - y y - - 50% 
Leading edge system y y y y y y 100% 
Complexity underestimated y y y y y - 83% 
Technical "fix" sought y - y 
- - - 33% 
Poor consultation y - - y y - 50% 
Changing requirements - - y - y y 50% 
Weak procurement y -
-
y y 
- 50% 
Development sites split - - y - - y 33% 
Project timetable slippage y y y y y y 100% 
Inadequate testing y - -
-
y 
- 33% 
Poor training y - - y y - 50% 
-Source (Flowers, 1997, Page 22) 
LAS - London Ambulance Service. 
PRS - Performing Right Society. 
TFS - The Field System. 
Information on the above cases can be found in Software failure: management failure 
(Flowers, 1996) in the following pages: 
London Ambulance Service. (Flowers, 1996, Pages 47- 93) 
Performing Right Society. (Flowers, 1996, Pages 7- 24) 
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Taurus 
Wessex 
The Field System 
Conlirm 
(Flowers. I 1Nh, Pages 1H1 - I 2l) 
(Flowers, I 99(), Pages I 2(1 - I 51) 
(Flowers, I 1J1H1, Pages I 2(,- \53) 
(Flowers, l91J6, Pages 28 - 45) 
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